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Abstract
Background and aims: Pragmatic language is a key difficulty in autism spectrum disorder. One such pragmatic skill is
verbal reference, which allows the current entity of shared interest between speakers to be identified and thus enables
fluid conversation. The aim of this review was to determine the extent to which studies have found that verbal reference
is impaired in autism spectrum disorder. We organise the review in terms of the methodology used and the modality
(production versus comprehension) in which proficiency with verbal reference was assessed. Evidence for the potential
cognitive underpinnings of these skills is also reviewed.
Main contribution and methods: To our knowledge, this is the first systematic review of verbal reference in autism
spectrum disorder. PsychINFO and Web of Science were systematically screened using the combination of search terms
outlined in this paper. Twenty-four studies met our inclusion criteria. Twenty-two of these examined production,
whereby the methodology ranged from elicited conversation through to elicited narrative, the ‘director’ task and
other referential communication paradigms. Three studies examined reference interpretation. (One study investigated
both production and appropriacy judgement). Four studies examined the relationship between appropriate usage of
verbal reference and formal language (lexico-syntactic ability). Two studies investigated whether reference production
related to Theory of Mind or Executive Functioning.
Conclusion and implications: Across a range of elicited production tasks, the predominant finding was that children
and adults with autism spectrum disorder demonstrate a deficit in the production of appropriate verbal reference in
comparison not only to typically developing groups, but also to groups with Developmental Language Disorder or Down
syndrome. In contrast, the studies of reference interpretation which compared performance to typical control groups all
found no between-group differences in this regard. To understand this cross-modality discrepancy, we need studies with
the same sample of individuals, whereby the task requirements for comprehension and production are as closely
matched as possible. The field also requires the development of experimental manipulations which allow us to pinpoint
precisely if and how each comprehension and/or production task requires mentalising and/or various components of
executive functioning. Only through such detailed and controlled experimental work would it be possible to determine
the precise location of impairments in verbal reference in autism spectrum disorder. A better understanding of this
would contribute to the development of interventions.
Keywords
Autism spectrum disorders, pragmatics, referential communication, narrative, audience design
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is deﬁned by persist-
ent deﬁcits in social-communication alongside
restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or
activities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013;
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 5th ed [DSM-5]). Social use of language, or
‘pragmatics’ (social verbal communication), is con-
sidered a central impairment in ASD (Landa, 2000).
Diﬃculties in this area hinder the ability to establish
and maintain reciprocity in conversation and impair
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the successful exchange of relevant information neces-
sary for collaboration, negotiation and daily inter-
action (Tager-Flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005). A deﬁcit
in pragmatics has additionally been linked to mental
health diﬃculties in a number of populations (e.g.
Helland, Lundervold, Heimann, & Posserud, 2014).
Whether all domains of pragmatics are equally
impaired or indeed impaired in all individuals with
ASD, however, remains unclear (Simmons, Paul, &
Volkman, 2014).
A core component of pragmatics is reference, that is
the ability to denote an entity, person or event with
suﬃcient clarity for one’s interlocutor. While theorists
from a semiotic perspective give equal weight to verbal
and non-verbal means (see Perkins, 2005, for discus-
sion), in the current review, we follow Norbury (2014)
among others in distinguishing pragmatic language
from social communication more broadly and therefore
we focus solely on ‘verbal reference’. Impaired verbal
reference is highly likely to have a severe detrimental
eﬀect on conversational ﬂow (and thus on social rela-
tionships) and on the ability to collaborate with others
(e.g. Murphy, Faulkner, & Farley, 2014), which would
also have educational consequences. While the appro-
priate production and interpretation of verbal reference
is often included in speech and language assessment and
intervention for individuals with ASD (e.g. Adams,
Gaile, Freed, & Lockton, 2010), the extent to which
this area of pragmatic ability is universally impaired in
this population has not been examined to date.
Forms of verbal reference vary greatly in complexity,
as presented in Table 1, from highly speciﬁc referring
expressions such as ‘the red ball on top of the cup-
board’ to pronominal referring expressions, such as
‘she’ or ‘it’. Bare noun phrases (deﬁnite: ‘the ball’;
indeﬁnite ‘a ball’) may be considered intermediate in
terms of speciﬁcity (e.g. Gundel, Hedberg, &
Zacharski, 1993). Correct use and interpretation of
verbal reference requires children to acquire the net-
work of potential forms used in his or her language.
Pronominal (and equivalent) systems, for example,
show great cross-linguistic variation in their level of
acquisition diﬃculty, depending on whether forms
vary regarding factors such as the gender, plurality or
honoriﬁc status of the referent and whether case needs
to be marked. Children learning Germanic and
Romance languages usually acquire pronominal form
by the mid-preschool years (e.g. Chiat, 1986; Girouard,
Ricard, & Decarie, 1997). The form of complex refer-
ring expressions can include, for example, adjectival
phrases (‘the red ball’) or modifying phrases such as
prepositional phrases (‘the ball on the shelf’) or relative
clauses (‘the ball that Daddy bought you’). Syntactic
forms used for complex referring expressions are gen-
erally mastered by the late preschool years (see, e.g.
Berman & Slobin, 1994; Brandt, 2011; Kidd &
Cameron-Faulkner, 2008).
An adult-like mastery of verbal reference not only
requires acquisition of form, but also the ability to vary
the level of complexity in accordance with context.
Referring terms are therefore matched to the informa-
tional needs of a speciﬁc interlocutor. The appropriate
use of verbal reference is often described by appealing
to Grice’s (1975) theory of communication, in particu-
lar the co-operative principle specifying the maxims of
quantity and manner. These specify that a speaker
should provide suﬃcient information for the listener
to determine reference but also be concise (i.e. speakers
should not be over-informative). Although many
researchers have since pointed out major problems for
the Gricean account (e.g. Gergely & Csibra, 2005;
Horn, 1984; Moore, 2014; Sperber & Wilson, 1995,
see also Levinson, 1989), the framework still provides
a useful means of conceptualising the types of skills
required to carry out and understand acts of reference.
Regardless of theoretical perspective, the match (or
mismatch) between a particular form of verbal refer-
ence (e.g. pronominal, bare noun phrase or complex
referring expression) and a particular context can be
judged as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’. Here, ‘context’ can
Table 1. Forms of verbal reference.
Forms of verbal reference
Pronominal and related forms of verbal reference
Pronoun He/she/it/they
Zero form Laura yawned and ___ fell asleep
Deixis That/this one/that girl
Simple/bare noun phrase Common noun The/a girl
Proper noun Laura
Complex referring expression With adjective The tall girl
With modifying phrase The girl on the bike
The girl that you met yesterday.
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include the information that speciﬁc interlocutors know
one another to share; for example, if a child knows that
his father is well acquainted with his friend Jamie, then
it would be over-informative to use a complex referring
such as ‘the Jamie that came to my birthday party’
every time the referent ‘Jamie’ is introduced into the
conversation. ‘Context’ can also include whether there
are competing referents in the visual context. To illus-
trate, if there is only one brush in the vicinity, then
asking a listener to pass ‘the brush’ may be suﬃcient.
In contrast, if more than one brush is present, then the
speaker may need to specify ‘the brush with the brown
handle’. Finally, the relevant ‘context’ would also
include how recently a referent has been mentioned.
That is, if a referent has just been mentioned in dia-
logue or narrative, the speaker can usually (depending
on whether there are competing referents) reduce the
speciﬁcity of the referring term further by using pro-
nouns. In this case, speaker and listener can use their
knowledge of the shared common ground to determine
which referents are likely to be most salient (Sperber &
Wilson, 1995) and/or activated in working memory,
which is usually considered to be the component of
short-term memory used to manipulate and update
concurrently incoming material (see Baddeley &
Hitch, 1974).
For the purpose of this review, we focus on whether
referring terms are appropriately based on the informa-
tional needs of the listener, given ‘context’ as deﬁned
above. Thus, when we say ‘appropriate’, this is not a
qualitative judgement; a participant who says, ‘Give me
the duck’ in a context in which he or she can see that
the addressee can see two ducks should arguably
receive a score equating to ‘incorrect’ for this particular
request. However, since even typical adult speakers do
not perform at ceiling in these types of tasks (Keysar,
2007) we use the terms ‘appropriate’ versus ‘inappro-
priate’ throughout, to describe the match or mismatch
between the form and context.
The ﬁrst aim of the current paper was therefore to
carry out a systematic review to determine whether an
impairment in the appropriate usage/interpretation of
verbal reference is a global feature of ASD (or whether
verbal reference is only impaired in individuals with
ASD with comorbid intellectual or formal language
diﬃculties). To this end, our focus was not on whether
individuals with ASD used the same forms of reference
(e.g. whether they use the same proportion of pronouns
within, for example, a conversation as do typically
developing controls). Rather, our focus was on whether
individuals with ASD are atypical in their understand-
ing of the ‘ﬁt’ between reference form and context.
If we found that some studies did not report an
impairment in verbal reference in ASD, our second
research goal was to investigate the extent to which
this might be due to either to the methodology used
or to the modality in which proﬁciency with verbal ref-
erence was measured. Finally, we also wished to inves-
tigate whether studies including individuals with ASD
provide evidence regarding the cognitive underpinnings
of verbal reference ability.
To determine our key search terms, we ﬁrst
attempted to pinpoint the types of tasks typically
used to assess verbal reference, that is naturalistic inter-
action, narrative or the ‘director task’/referential com-
munication paradigm (see Graf & Davies, 2014, for a
review). We also attempted to identify the key concepts
most commonly associated with verbal reference in the
literature. One such concept is that of ‘listener needs’ or
‘audience design’; as previously described, to be opti-
mally informative, a referring term should provide suf-
ﬁcient information without being over-informative.
This type of adaption to the informational needs of
the listener is considered appropriate audience design
(Clark & Murphy, 1982). Successful audience design
may be achieved through consideration of the informa-
tion listener and speaker share, or ‘common ground’
(Clark & Marshall, 1981).
Criteria for current review
Systematic searches were conducted in two databases:
PsychINFO and Web of Science for all dates up until
March 2016. Our search terms were entered into the
‘keyword’ ﬁeld as follows: (a) autis* AND narrative,
(b) autis* AND referen* AND communicat*, (c)
autis* AND common ground, autis* AND audience
design, (d) autis* AND listener needs and (e) autis*
AND director task. Given that these two search engines
are imperfect, it is inevitable that this review will not be
exhaustive. Indeed, we found and included one study
which met our search engine criteria (Kuijper,
Hartman, & Hendriks, 2015), but which was detected
by neither search engine. Nonetheless, this review
should constitute an accurate representation of litera-
ture in this topic to date.
An initial review of titles and abstracts excluded stu-
dies that were clearly not related to the key topics of
interest, such as articles on literature or politics. The
remaining full articles were then examined and our
inclusion criteria were applied as follows. To be
included the study was required to (1) include partici-
pants with a diagnosis of either ASD, Asperger syn-
drome or pervasive development disorder-not
otherwise speciﬁed, (2) include a measure of the appro-
priacy of the match between verbal (lexico-syntactic)
reference and context, (3) contain quantitative data
which were analysed statistically and (4) to include a
control group consisting of either (a) typically develop-
ing individuals, (b) individuals with Developmental
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Language Disorder (DLD) (Speciﬁc Language
Impairment) or (c) individuals with an impairment in
non-verbal (performance) IQ. Without one of these
control groups it is diﬃcult to conclude whether or
not individuals with ASD are impaired in referential
communication. A study was additionally excluded if:
(a) it was a case study with a single participant (due to
issues of generalisability), (b) it was a training study
which did not contain suﬃciently detailed baseline
data for conclusions regarding impairment in verbal
reference to be drawn or (c) it exclusively examined
non-verbal communication such as gesture, facial
expression and eye contact or solely considered prosody
(rather than lexico-syntactic form). Studies exclusively
examining non-verbal communication were excluded
because we were primarily interested in verbal refer-
ence. One reason for this is that when investigating
the role of cognitive underpinnings, it is likely that
the role of formal language, in particular, would play
quite a diﬀerent role in relation to non-verbal reference
than in relation to verbal reference.
The total number of studies considered for inclu-
sion and those excluded at each stage in the search
process are shown in Figure 1. The 24 studies that
met our inclusion criteria are listed in Tables 2 to 7.
First, studies comparing the production of verbal ref-
erence in ASD and TD groups are summarised. Next,
studies that compare comprehension of verbal refer-
ence in ASD and TD groups are summarised.
Finally, evidence for the potential cognitive underpin-
nings related to successful verbal reference is
reviewed.
Production of referring expressions
We ﬁrst review studies that have used methodologies
which most closely map onto naturalistic usage of
verbal reference in daily life. We then review studies
that have measured appropriate verbal reference
during more structured narrative tasks, and ﬁnally the
most structured elicitation technique, the referential
communication task.
Records idenfied through 



































Records idenfied through tle screening  
(n = 110) 
Records aer duplicates 
removed (n = 57) 
Total records excluded  
(n = 25) 




accuracy via gesture (n=1); 
no stascal analysis of 
data (n=2); training study 
without suﬃcient baseline 
data (n=1); neither a TD 
nor a DLD nor a PIQ-
impaired control group (n= 4).  
Abstracts assessed for 
eligibility  
(n = 57)
Total records excluded  
(n = 8) 
Did not measure verbal 
referenal accuracy (n=8) 
Full-text arcles assessed 
for eligibility  
(n = 49)
Studies included in 
qualitave synthesis  
(n = 24) 
Figure 1. PRISMA diagram of study identification and selection.
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Production of referring terms during
conversation
Though most closely mirroring real-life interaction,
only one study containing at least one control group
with clearly deﬁned characteristics returned in our
search measured the appropriacy of verbal reference
use by individuals with ASD during conversation
(see Table 2). In this study, Baltaxe and D’Angiola
(1996) examined the use of pronominal, demonstrative
(e.g. here/there) and comparative (e.g. bigger/smaller)
reference during an hour-long interactive play session.
Children with ASD (M¼ 7;9 yrs, n¼10) were matched
on language ability with a chronologically younger TD
group (M¼ 3;5 yrs, n¼8). Use of ambiguous reference
(e.g. saying ‘it’ when the reference is unclear) was
never found in the TD group (p. 252). This study
also compared the ASD group to a group with
DLD, (n¼8) matched on receptive language and
Mean Length of Utterance. DLD is a diagnosis of
language impairment in the absence of a known bio-
medical condition (Bishop, Snowling, Thompson, &
Greenhalgh, 2016). In comparison to the DLD
group, the ASD group used more ambiguous personal
pronouns, though this failed to reach signiﬁcance. This
is presumably in part due to the extremely small
sample size. Nonetheless, as we will see, the ﬁnding
of a tendency towards ambiguity and the ﬁnding of
deﬁcits relative to children with DLD will be a recur-
rent theme throughout this review.
Production of referring terms within narrative
Overview. Narrative tasks usually require the participant
to generate or retell a story based on a picture book or
ﬁlm. They therefore constitute a monologue, rather than
a reciprocal interaction. Therefore, narrative tasks
might seem quite far removed from naturalistic verbal
interaction. Nonetheless, narrative measures have been
found to correlate strongly with standardised measures
of pragmatic language more broadly, such as the Test of
Pragmatic Language (e.g. Manolitsi & Botting, 2011).
Since we are interested in the degree to which indi-
viduals understand the function of verbal reference, our
focus is on measures which assess whether the lexico-
syntactic form is appropriate given the context. In the
sentence ‘Laura went to the shop and she bought some
bread’, for example, the initial reference ‘Laura’ is
appropriate as it introduces a new character. The
third-person subject pronoun ‘she’ is also appropriately
unambiguous, referring the listener back to a character
‘Laura’ recently established as the focus of the conver-
sation. The use of ‘she’ in this way is an example of
‘anaphoric reference’. Errors may be in the direction of
over-informativity (e.g. if the full noun ‘Laura’ were
used throughout). When two potential referents have
recently been mentioned, conversely, an anaphoric ref-
erence may be under-informative (e.g. ‘I saw Laura and
Karen and she looked upset’).
Our survey of studies, which quantitatively mea-
sured referential accuracy within narrative, is orga-
nised in terms of the elicitation method employed.
First, we review narrative generation studies, in which
narrative is elicited from a stimulus (generally pictures
depicting a story) without a prior model. Then, we
review narrative retell studies, in which events are wit-
nessed either in picture or video format and then
retold either with reference to the original stimuli or
from memory.
Narrative generation. We ﬁrst discuss narrative gener-
ation studies where groups were not well matched (i.e.
not matched for formal language ability, non-verbal IQ
and chronological age), followed by those that were
(see Table 3). The ﬁve less well-matched studies which
examined narrative generation all included primary
school-aged children (Colozzo, Morris, & Mirenda,
2015; Ma¨kinen et al., 2014; Norbury & Bishop, 2003;
Norbury, Gemmell, & Paul, 2014; Tager-Flusberg,
1995). One of these studies (Norbury et al., 2014) also
included young adolescents. Three of the ﬁve studies
elicited narratives using the 24-page wordless story
book ‘Frog, where are you?’ (Mayer, 1969) which has
been used extensively to compare narrative generation
cross-linguistically in TD children (see Berman &
Slobin, 1994). One study found that children with
ASD showed awareness of the rules for introducing
and reintroducing characters in a narrative (Norbury
& Bishop, 2003). That is, they were as likely as a TD
group to use a noun phrase, rather than a pronoun, to
reintroduce a character when it was not the most
recently mentioned. All ﬁve studies, including
Norbury and Bishop (2003), however, found evidence
that children with ASD were more likely to use ambigu-
ous reference than were typical controls.
Three of these studies also compared the ASD group
to a group of individuals with DLD. Norbury and
Bishop (2003) found that their ASD sample used
more ambiguous nouns than did a DLD group
matched for chronological age and language ability.
The same pattern of results was found by Colozzo
et al. (2015), whereby the ASD group possessed super-
ior formal language ability than the DLD group but
still used a higher number of ambiguous character ref-
erences than did the DLD group. Finally, in Norbury
et al. (2014), the diﬀerence between the ASD group and
the DLD group did not reach signiﬁcance. However,
there was a moderate eﬀect size (d¼.47) despite the fact
that the ASD group in fact had signiﬁcantly better
formal language skills than the DLD group.
Malkin et al. 5






















































ASD: autism spectrum disorder; MLU: mean length of utterance; 3: well matched; PPVT: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test; SLI: specific language impairment; TACL: Test for Auditory Comprehension of























Table 3. Production – Narrative generation (stimulus present).

























ASD/SLI: d ¼ 0.40











































Norbury et al. (2014) n¼ 22 ASD: 11;1 (6;5–15;71)
TD: 9;8 (6;7–15;1)
LI: 10;7 (6;5–15;3)






















Colozzo et al. (2015) n¼ 12 ASD: 8;5 (6–10)
TD: 8;6
SLI: 8;5





























































































per group Language ASD diagnosis Formal language Age Non-verbal IQ
Statistical analysis and
inter-rater reliability









































Tager-Flusberg (1995) n¼ 10 ASD: 12;1
TD: 7;9
MR: 11;3




























ADI-R: Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; AS: Asperger syndrome; ASD: autism spectrum disorder; BPVS: British Picture Vocabulary Scale; CELF: Clinical Evaluation of
Language Fundamentals; CELFRLC: Receptive Language Composite; CELFRS: recalling sentences; DSM: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; HFA: high-functioning autism; HFA-F: female: HFA-M: male; ICC; intra-
class correlation coefficient; ITPA: Illinois Test of Psychological Abilities; MLU: mean length of utterance; MR: mentally retarded; 3: well matched; PLI: pragmatic language impairment; PPVT: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test;
RCM: Raven’s coloured matrices; SCQ: Social Communication Questionnaire; SLI: specific language impairment; TD: typically developing; TD-F: female; TTFC: Token Test for Children; WAIS: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale;
WISC: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; X: not well matched.
Only one of these ﬁve studies reported no diﬀer-
ences between an ASD and TD group in production
of ambiguous character reference (Ma¨kinen et al.,
2014). This study was carried out with Finnish chil-
dren aged 5–10 years. Groups were well matched for
chronological age but the TD group scored higher for
formal language and memory. One reason for the
lack of a between-groups diﬀerence in this study
might be that the participants were Finnish speaking
and the authors note that in Finnish, TD children
tend not to master accurate reference until eight
years of age.
All of the above ﬁve narrative generation studies
were not well matched to typical controls. Four add-
itional studies examined narrative generation in com-
parison to well-matched controls. Three of these studies
found impairments in individuals with ASD in com-
parison to typical controls. One of these studies
focussed on adults and used the Mayer (1969) story
‘Frog, where are you?’ (Colle, Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, & van der Lely, 2008), which was told
to an experimenter who did not have visual access to
the story pictures. Their sample with ASD used more
ambiguous references to the dog and non-protagonist
characters than did a TD group, despite being told that
the listener had no previous knowledge of the story and
that they should therefore be ‘as clear as possible’. The
other three studies tested upper-primary school-aged
children and adolescents. Two elicited narratives
using a 29-page wordless picture book called
‘Tuesday’ by Wiesner (1991). These two studies
reported that children and adolescents with ASD were
more likely to use ambiguous reference in comparison
to well-matched TD groups (Banney, Harper-Hill, &
Arnott, 2015; Suh et al., 2014). The third study required
participants to tell four stories to an experimenter, who
did not have visual access to the pictures. Each story
had two characters of the same gender and which were
speciﬁcally constructed to examine reference selection
for character introduction, character maintenance and
character reintroduction (Kuijper et al., 2015). In this
study, there were no signiﬁcance diﬀerences in appro-
priacy of reference selection between the ASD and TD
groups, despite large sample sizes (and despite the fact
the ASD group scored signiﬁcantly lower on the WISC
‘Vocabulary’ measure). However, the stories were much
simpler than those used by the majority of narrative
studies, both in terms of length (as each consisted
solely of six pictures) and in terms of the amount of
detail in each picture. This might have reduced both the
working memory load of the task and the degree to
which the individuals with ASD were likely to be dis-
tracted by irrelevant information. The potential issue of
stimuli-dependent performance is one which will also
emerge in the next section.
Narrative retell. In contrast to narrative generation, nar-
rative retell instead involves listening to and/or viewing
a story unfold, then retelling events from memory.
Though not as widely used as generation tasks, four
studies meeting our inclusion criteria utilised a retell
method (see Table 4).
In the study by Arnold, Bennetto and Diehl (2009),
children and adolescents with and without ASD
watched a Sylvester and Tweety cartoon and then
retold this from memory to a confederate who feigned
ignorance of the story. There was no narrator dialogue
in the video clip. Instead participants simply watched
events unfold. Each character reference was coded for
recency of mention of the antecedent. If a referent was
mentioned no more than two clauses back, the children
with ASD (9;812;9) used a signiﬁcantly higher pro-
portion of noun phrases (as opposed to pronouns)
than did the typical controls, which the authors inter-
preted as over-informativity in this context. In contrast,
the adolescents with ASD (13;1–17;8) did not diﬀer
from a well-matched TD group in any of the measures
used. However, Arnold et al. (2009) did not assess the
appropriacy per se of verbal reference selection; the
latter does not solely depend on how many clauses
back the antecedent was but rather, whether a referen-
tial alterative (e.g. Tweety Bird/Sylvester) was also
recently mentioned and of course whether the pronouns
are gender marked.
In addition, it is possible that the particular elicit-
ation method/stimuli used partly accounts for discrep-
ant ﬁndings between studies. To examine the extent to
which elicitation method inﬂuences performance,
Novogrodsky (2013) compared a narrative retell and
generation task, analysing the ambiguity of third-
person subject pronouns. The same data were reana-
lysed by Novogrodsky and Edelson (2016), whereby
they extended their analysis to include subject and
object pronouns. The retell task was the ‘Bus Story’
task (Renfrew, 1991), which requires the child to
retell a story, which has ﬁrst been told to the child,
about a bus that escapes from its driver. In this task,
participants can look at the pictures as they retell the
story. In the generation task, children told ‘Frog, where
are you?’ (Mayer, 1969) from pictures, without an ini-
tial model. Whilst ASD and TD group performance did
not diﬀer in terms of ambiguous pronominal reference
during the retold Bus Story, in the generation task the
ASD group used signiﬁcantly more ambiguous
pronouns.
Unfortunately, due to the design of this study, there
are many potential reasons why results may have dif-
fered depending on the particular elicitation paradigm.
First, since the children had just heard the administra-
tor tell the Bus Story, those with good auditory recall
(which is often a relative strength in ASD) might simply
Malkin et al. 9
Table 4. Production – narrative retell.
Participants Matching Task Measure of reference
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ADI-R: Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; ASD: autism spectrum disorder; ASD-O; older; ASD-Y; younger; MLU: mean length of utterance; 3: well matched; PPVT: Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test; SCQ: Social Communication Questionnaire; SRS: Social Responsiveness Scale; TD: typically developing; TD-O; older; TD-Y: younger; VIQ: verbal IQ, WAIS: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; WISC:
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; X: not well matched.
have been able to select appropriate forms of verbal
reference by recalling this ad verbum. Second, the
‘Bus Story’ only consists of 12 pictures and thus it
could be that the relative simplicity of the story allowed
more accurate use of reference.
The fourth study of narrative retell was conducted
by de Marchena and Eigsti (2016), who used 60 second
cartoon clips. This study diﬀers from the other narra-
tive studies in that listener informational needs were
speciﬁcally manipulated by having two within-subjects
conditions: ‘shared’ (the listener watched a short pre-
view of the clip with the participant) and ‘private’ (the
listener was not present during any part of the clip).
Some aspects of de Marchena and Eigsti’s (2016) data
indicate that the adolescents with ASD considered lis-
tener information needs to a degree; there was a signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence in communicative quality ratings (i.e. a
rating of how easy the story was to follow) between
narratives produced by the ASD group in the shared
versus the private condition. However, for the key
dependent variable, the degree of referential shortening,
there was a between-groups diﬀerence. The authors
argue that the referential shortening eﬀect is a measure
of whether participants take audience needs into
account. The argument is that, if speakers take audi-
ence needs into account, their narratives should be
shorter when retelling in the shared as opposed to the
private condition. This eﬀect was seen for the typical
control but not the ASD group, indicating that the
latter had diﬃculty adapting to listener information
needs. However, de Marchena and Eigsti’s analysis
rests on the assumption that a longer narrative would
contain a greater number of full noun phrases or indeed
noun phrases with modifying phrases (see Table 1).
This is of course not necessarily the case since a
proper noun (e.g. Laura) is usually highly informative
and yet does not diﬀer in word length from a pronoun.
Conversely, not all modifying phrases provide suﬃcient
diﬀerentiating information. The extent to which refer-
ence selection was appropriate for a given context was
not examined.
Nonetheless, there was a signiﬁcant relationship
between the referential shortening eﬀect and symptom
severity as measured by the Social Responsiveness
Scale (Constantino & Gruber, 2007) in the ASD
group, whereby those more likely to demonstrate the
eﬀect showed less ASD traits. This supports the
authors’ conclusion that the referential shortening
eﬀect taps some of the social communicative deﬁcits
which are diagnostic for ASD. Older children with
ASD were also more likely to show the referential
shortening eﬀect than those who were younger, tying
in with Arnold et al.’s (2009) ﬁnding that selection of
appropriate reference may improve with age in the
ASD population.
Referential communication tasks. Over all narrative elicit-
ation methods, the overwhelming tendency indicates an
impairment in the appropriate usage (production) of
verbal reference. However, it might be argued that the
diﬃculties individuals with ASD experience with narra-
tive tasks are not related to deﬁcits in the production of
appropriate verbal reference per se, but instead are
related to extraneous demands required by these
tasks. Individuals with ASD may be particularly hin-
dered in narrative tasks by the need for episodic
memory (e.g. Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014),
executive functioning (e.g. Geurts, Verte´, Oosterlaan,
Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004), imagination (e.g. Lind
et al., 2014) and central coherence (e.g. Happe´ &
Frith, 2006). Therefore, an elicitation method which
does not burden episodic memory and which mirrors
the back-and-forth nature of conversation might be
better able to reveal underlying latent ability in individ-
uals with ASD to use verbal reference appropriately.
One such method is the referential communication task.
Referential communication tasks allow both the pro-
duction and comprehension of referring terms to be
measured. Here, we ﬁrst review the results of studies
where referential communication tasks have been used
to examine the production of referring terms. Studies
which examined the interpretation of reference are dis-
cussed later in this review. Our search returned ﬁve
studies involving a type of referential communication
paradigm to examine the appropriacy of referring terms
selected in production.
A very frequently used type of referential communi-
cation task that allows visual common ground to be
manipulated is the ‘Director Task’ (Keysar, Barr,
Balin, & Brauner, 2000). Typically, an array of items
or pictures is presented to a speaker, or ‘director’ who
provides relevant information to a listener to enable
them to select a target referent. The inclusion of items
that diﬀer in only one aspect, e.g. ‘big cup’ versus ‘small
cup’ creates the need to alter the speciﬁcity of the refer-
ring terms selected. The visual perspective of the listener
can be manipulated to either match or be discrepant
with that of the speaker by blocking visual access to
some referents in the array. Two potential conditions
are therefore possible: A ‘shared’ condition, in which all
potential referents can be viewed by both parties (i.e.
visual perspective taking is not required), and a ‘privi-
leged’ condition, in which the speaker has visual access
to referents which are blocked from the view of the
listener (i.e. visual perspective taking is required). In
the shared condition, the use of a size adjective (e.g.
‘big cup’) is appropriate as the listener has visual
access to two possible referents, whilst in the privileged
condition a bare noun (e.g. ‘cup’) is appropriate as
visual access to the competing cup is blocked from
the listener. Table 5 shows studies utilising this
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Table 5. Production – referential communication tasks.
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ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; AS: Asperger syndrome; ASD: autism spectrum disorder; ASD-O; older; ASD-Y; younger; CELF: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals; DSM: Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders; FSIQ: Full Scale IQ; 3: well matched; PIQ: performance IQ; SCQ: Social Communication Questionnaire; TD: typically developing; VIQ: verbal IQ, WAIS: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; WISC:
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; X: not well matched.
paradigm to examine production of referring terms
meeting our inclusion criteria.
Using a director task, Nadig, Vivanti and Ozonoﬀ
(2009: Exp 1) found that children with ASD aged 9–14
years used proportionally fewer appropriate referring
terms to identify objects than a well-matched TD
group (both groups: n¼ 17). In the privileged condi-
tion, participants with ASD tended towards over-infor-
mativity, inappropriately using a speciﬁc referring term
(e.g. ‘big cup’ when there was only one cup available
from the listener’s visual perspective) signiﬁcantly more
frequently than the TD group (p5.01). In the shared
condition, the ASD group more frequently failed to use
a complex referring term when two competing referents
were visible, though this group diﬀerence was only of
marginal signiﬁcance (p¼ .08, eﬀect size r¼ 0.24).
These ﬁndings reﬂect the simultaneous over and
under-informativity in reference use by individuals
with ASD which was also the general ﬁnding from nar-
rative and conversational studies.
Fukumura (2015) used a similar director task
whereby she directly compared the ‘privileged’ and
‘shared’ perspective conditions. The dependent variable
was the percentage of complex referring expressions
(e.g. ‘the small door’) as opposed to unmodiﬁed
nouns (e.g. ‘the door’). Thus, if individuals with ASD
were taking listener informational needs into account,
there should be signiﬁcantly less complex referring
expressions used in the ‘privileged’ condition, since
this would be over-informative from the addressee’s
perspective. For both 6- to 10-year-olds (Exp 1) and
11- to 16-year-olds (Exp 2), there was a group by con-
dition interaction, indicating that the typical controls
were signiﬁcantly more likely to make this audience
design distinction than were the individuals with ASD.
Nadig et al. (2009) and Fukumura’s (2016) studies
indicate that when the speaker and listener perspectives
diﬀer, individuals with ASD have diﬃculty selecting
referring expressions appropriate to their listener’s per-
spective. However, even when participants know that
their listener can see the same visual array as them-
selves, Nadig et al. (2009) found diminished perform-
ance for ASD groups. This latter observation is
reﬂected in the ﬁndings of two referential communica-
tion studies which did not manipulate listener perspec-
tive. Both used adaptations of the original reference
communication paradigm developed by Glucksberg
and Krauss (1967) in which the participant and a con-
federate play a version of the ‘Guess Who?’ game.
Volden, Mulcahy and Holdgrafer (1997) asked adoles-
cents and adults with ASD to provide information to
identify a target from one of two circles which varied on
one of four possible attributes (colour, shape, pattern
and position of a small black dot). Whilst individuals
with ASD never failed to provide the distinguishing
feature in their description, they were more likely to
include redundant information that did not uniquely
identify the target referent.
Using a similar paradigm, Dahlgren and Dahlgren
Sandberg (2008) asked children with ASD to provide
descriptions to identify a given face from a selection of
16. They measured how many of the features men-
tioned were ‘relevant’ (appropriately discriminated
between pictures), ‘irrelevant’ (common to all pictures
e.g. ‘has a mouth’) and ‘redundant’ (already a given).
Children with ASD produced signiﬁcantly fewer rele-
vant features than did TD controls and they also
included proportionally more irrelevant than relevant
features than the TD group.
Whilst director tasks have been used to manipulate
visual common ground knowledge, social common
ground (namely the ability to determine the knowledge
what one shares with a speciﬁc interlocutor; Moll &
Kadipasaoglu, 2013) is arguably the skill used more
often when selecting referring terms in everyday con-
versation. In a ‘referential pact’ paradigm, Nadig, Seth
and Sasson (2015) examined whether adults with ASD
engaged in lexical entrainment – the process by which
interlocutors come to agree on mutual referring terms.
Participants provided information to enable their lis-
tener to identify one of an array of abstract forms
(tangrams). Individuals tended to alter referential
descriptions in co-operation with the listener over suc-
cessive trials (e.g. pairs may agree to call a shape ‘the
elephant’ after initially describing it as ‘a four legged or
two legged animal facing the right. . . The head is a
parallelogram and its back leg is a rectangle and the
front legs look like paws’). To investigate whether this
alignment of referring terms was due merely to priming
or if social common ground was utilised, the game con-
tinued with either the original or a new listener. If
common ground was considered, the agreed referring
terms should be used with the original but not a new
listener. In the ‘new listener’ condition, the ASD group
were marginally (p¼ .05, r¼ .37) less likely than the TD
group to change the referring expression (referential
pact) they had agreed with the original listener.
Studies comparing ASD with other neurodevelopmental
disorders. Some studies returned in our search com-
pared groups of individuals with ASD to groups of
children with other neurodevelopmental disorders.
For ﬁve studies the disorder concerned was DLD.
Such comparisons between ASD and DLD can help
elucidate the degree to which formal language (lexical
and morpho-syntactic skills) might be a contributing
factor in proﬁciency with verbal reference.
One such study is that of Manolitsi and Botting
(2011) (Table 6), who found that children with ASD
were signiﬁcantly poorer in pronominal reference use
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Table 6. Production – studies comparing ASD with another clinical group (where no typically developing group was included in the study).
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ASD: autism spectrum disorder; CELF: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals; DS: Down syndrome; LIPS: Leiter International Performance Scale; 3: well matched; PIQ: Performance IQ; PPVT: Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test; SLI: specific language impairment; TD: typically developing; X: not well matched.
than were children with DLD during a narrative retell
task (‘Peter and the Cat, Leita˜o & Allan, 2003). Both
groups were Greek-speaking children matched on
expressive language, chronological age, gender and
non-verbal IQ. Participants were categorised on a
scale of 0–3. A child categorised as 0 would generally
show great diﬃculty with appropriate selection of refer-
ring expressions whereas a child categorised as 3 would
be a proﬁcient user of verbal reference. There was a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the ASD and
DLD group in this regard, with children with DLD
showing better performance. Unfortunately, the ASD
group also had lower receptive language than did the
group with DLD, which makes any between-group dif-
ferences in measures of verbal reference diﬃcult to
interpret.
The remaining four DLD comparison studies have
already been mentioned above, since they also included
a typical control group (Baltaxe & D’Angiola, 1996;
Colozzo et al., 2015; Norbury & Bishop, 2003;
Norbury et al., 2014). All four found signiﬁcant diﬃ-
culties (or eﬀect size indicative of a diﬀerence, Norbury
et al., 2014), whereby the ASD group performed worse
than the DLD group. This is particularly striking in the
case of the two DLD comparison studies in which the
group with ASD had higher formal language scores
than the group with DLD (Colozzo et al., 2015;
Norbury et al., 2014). If the ASD group still showed
signiﬁcantly greater diﬃculties in verbal reference, this
provides somewhat stronger evidence that formal lan-
guage is unlikely to be the main cause of these prag-
matic language diﬃculties.
In sum, the results of all ﬁve studies which com-
pared ASD to DLD suggest that, although referential
accuracy poses a challenge for children in both
groups, deﬁcits in referential communication are
more pronounced in individuals with ASD, even
when the latter have superior lexio-syntactic abilities.
Thus, referential communication deﬁcits in ASD are
unlikely to be solely attributable to diﬃculties with
formal language.
In addition to cross-syndrome comparisons with
DLD, two studies returned in our search compared
the use of reference in ASD and Down syndrome
(DS), which is a neurodevelopmental disorder asso-
ciated with intellectual disability (see Table 7). The
ﬁrst study is that of Loveland, McEvoy, Tunali and
Kelley (1990) who tested children with ASD and chil-
dren with DS (n¼16 in each group) matched on verbal
mental age. Children were asked to retell a story
depicted via a video or puppet show to a naı¨ve listener.
In each group an equal proportion of children made
ambiguous references to characters. Whilst Loveland
et al. (1990) aimed for participants to have ‘similar’
non-verbal IQ and chronological age, the ASD group
had marginally higher mean IQ scores and chrono-
logical age than the DS group.
In a less structured task, again comparing reference
use in ASD and DS groups, Loveland, Tunalia,
Mcevoy and Kelley (1989) asked participants to pro-
vide information to a naı¨ve listener (E2) about how to
play a board game. Participants were helped by E1 to
provide adequate information using a gradient of
prompts from more general, for example, ‘Tell me
about these things here’ to more speciﬁc, for example,
‘Tell me where to start the game’. The ASD group
produced signiﬁcantly less ‘adequate’ descriptions
than did the DS group at the most ‘general’ level of
prompting and they also required a higher level of spe-
ciﬁc prompts than did the DS group to provide the
adequate amount of information. This was the case
even though the two groups were matched on verbal
age and although the ASD group tended towards
higher non-verbal IQ scores than the DS group.
Given that the ASD group had overall higher IQ in
both studies, yet exhibited diﬃculties equal to, or
more pronounced than, a DS group, these studies sug-
gest that the ability to develop appropriate usage of
verbal reference may not be due solely to latent non-
verbal intellectual diﬃculties.
Production summary. Overall, our search returned 22 stu-
dies of verbal reference production in ASD. There were
seven studies which compared a group with ASD to a
group with another neurodevelopmental disorder
(either DLD or DS) and all but one of these studies
found indications of poorer performance by the ASD
group.
Eleven studies compared a group with ASD to a
group of typical controls, whereby groups were either
not well matched for formal language and/or non-
verbal IQ ability, or this was not reported (Baltaxe &
D’Angiola, 1996; Colozzo et al., 2015; Dahlgren &
Dahlgren Sandberg, 2008; Ma¨kinen et al., 2014;
Nadig et al., 2015; Norbury & Bishop, 2003; Norbury
et al., 2014; Novogrodsky, 2013; Novogrodsky &
Edelson, 2016; Tager-Flusberg, 1995; Volden et al.,
1997). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that 10 out of
these 11 studies reported that individuals with ASD
performed signiﬁcantly worse than typical controls on
at least one reference measure.
Finally, eight studies did compare a group with ASD
to well-matched controls and all except one (Kuijper
et al., 2015) of these well-matched case–control studies
found evidence of a deﬁcit in comparison to the typical
group in terms of appropriacy of verbal reference usage
(Arnold et al., 2009; Banney et al., 2015; Colle et al.,
2008; de Marchena & Eigsti, 2016; Fukumura, 2016;
Nadig et al., 2009; Suh et al., 2014). These latter
seven studies include a range of age groups. They also
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Table 7. Comprehension – referential communication task.




































































































ADOS: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; ASD: autism spectrum disorder; DSM-III: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed; DSM-IV: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed; 3: well
matched; TD: typically developing; VPT: Visual perspective taking; WAIS: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; WISC: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; X: not well matched.
include a range of elicitation methods, namely narrative
generation (Banney et al., 2015; Colle et al., 2008; Suh
et al., 2014), narrative retell (Arnold et al., 2009), the
‘director’ task (Fukumura, 2016; Nadig et al., 2009)
and interlocutor-speciﬁc perspective taking (de
Marchena & Eigsti, 2016). Therefore, it is safe to con-
clude that there is very good evidence for a clear




In contrast to the ample number of studies examining
the production of referring terms in ASD, we found
only three studies that compared ASD to another
group in terms of comprehension of the same phenom-
ena (see Table 7). All three suggest that the pattern of
ability diﬀers considerably between the production and
comprehension of referring terms. Although not exam-
ining interpretation of referring expressions per se,
Volden et al. (1997) examined the ability of the adoles-
cents and adults with ASD to judge whether the addres-
see in a referential communication paradigm had
suﬃcient information to be able to correctly identify
the referent. The authors argue that their ASD group
performed at ceiling on this meta-pragmatic judgement
task. In fact the ASD group were correct on average
87% of the time but the typical group were correct
100% of time (with an SD of zero), with the result
that statistical analyses were not carried out.
Moreover, since the Glucksberg and Krauss (1967)
paradigm was used (where the participant and the con-
federate are aware that they are viewing identical sets of
cards), it could be argued that the ability to take
another’s perspective was not necessary for this task
since the participant merely has to judge whether a con-
federate’s instruction is informative from his or her own
perspective.
The ﬁnal two studies did in fact investigate perform-
ance in reference interpretation where the participant’s
perspective diﬀered from that of the speaker. Both used
the director task. In contrast to the other ‘director’
studies already outlined, here the participants were in
the role of the addressee. In key (ambiguous) condition
trials, each participant is instructed to pick up an object
(e.g. spoon) for which the participant (but crucially, not
the ‘director’) can see a referential alternative (e.g.
another spoon). One dependent variable is thus the
number of egocentric errors made, i.e. the number of
trials on which a participant selects the object which is
occluded from the director’s view and thus cannot be
the intended referent. A second dependent variable is
typically response latency. That is, the longer a partici-
pant takes to select the correct object is an indication of
the degree to which he or she (egocentrically) con-
sidered the referential alterative as a possible target.
In the ﬁrst such study, Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland
and Keysar (2010) examined the ability of adolescents
with ASD to interpret referring expressions (e.g. ‘the
cup’ versus ‘the big cup’) when responding to instruc-
tions in a shared and a privileged condition. Across
both groups, participants made egocentric errors on
39% of trials in the key (ambiguous) condition and
their response latencies were also signiﬁcantly longer
in the ambiguous than in the neutral condition, indi-
cating that they considered the referential alternative
prior to making correct selections. However, crucially,
there were no between-group diﬀerences for either of
these dependent variables. This indicates that the ASD
group were as able as the TD group to use visual
perspective taking to interpret verbal reference, at
least when the visual perspective is as simple as deter-
mining whether the interlocutor can see a particular
object. Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird and Heyes
(2015) carried out a computerised version of the dir-
ector task with adults. Similarly to Begeer et al.
(2010), they found no between-group diﬀerences.
Moreover, they found that adults with and without
ASD were equally successful in completing the task
when a human addressee (avatar) was replaced with
a camera.
Thus, the three reference interpretation studies with
typical control groups align in suggesting that the abil-
ity to take another’s perspective to accurately interpret
reference is relatively spared in ASD.
Potential cognitive underpinnings
The picture emerging from studies on the interpretation
of verbal reference is that this is not an area of impair-
ment in individuals with ASD (Begeer et al., 2010;
Sanstieban et al., 2015). This stands in stark contrast
to the overwhelming ﬁnding that individuals with ASD
are impaired relative to both typical peers and peers
with neurodevelopmental when reference production is
examined. One possible reason for the apparent dis-
crepancy between an impairment in the selection of
an appropriate referring expression (production) and
an intact ability to take another’s perspective to inter-
pret a referring term might be the diﬀering cognitive
underpinnings of each skill. We now therefore survey
studies which explicitly examined relations between ref-
erential communication in ASD and the potential cog-
nitive underpinnings of this skill.
We begin by examining studies which have examined
relationships between proﬁciency with verbal reference,
on the one hand, and either formal language (lexical or
syntactic) proﬁciency and/or non-verbal IQ, on the
other hand, in the samples of individuals with ASD.
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Non-verbal IQ
Three studies (all discussed above) examined the rela-
tionship between non-verbal IQ and the appropriacy of
reference selection. Nadig et al. (2009) found that per-
formance in the shared perspective condition correlated
with non-verbal IQ, that is those with higher non-
verbal IQ used more adjectives when they (and their
interlocutor) could see two referential alternatives
(e.g. two ducks) than when only one potential referent
was present. However, in the privileged perspective
condition there was no relationship with non-verbal
IQ, which makes the ﬁrst ﬁnding diﬃcult to interpret.
In line with this latter ﬁnding, both Dahlgren and
Dahlgren Sandberg (2008) and Fukumura (2016) did
not ﬁnd any evidence for a relationship between non-
verbal IQ and any measures of reference production in
their ASD groups. Thus, on the whole, these ﬁndings –
when considered together with the studies outlined
above comparing children with ASD to children with
DS – indicate that non-verbal IQ is unlikely to play a
primary causal role in diﬃculties with verbal reference
in ASD (although analyses in future studies should cer-
tainly control for non-verbal IQ).
Formal language
Three studies (all discussed above) examined the rela-
tionship between formal language and the appropriacy
of reference selection. All three studies used a referen-
tial communication paradigm. Dahlgren and Dahlgren
Sandberg (2008) found that verbal IQ correlated in the
ASD group (but not in the TD group) with the number
of relevant features mentioned and their measure of
referential eﬃciency. However, since they did not
manipulate the distinction between the participant’s
and the interlocutor’s perspectives, it is unclear whether
this indicates that formal language is important for the
appropriacy of reference selection or whether it merely
suggests that a more advanced mastery of formal lan-
guage leads to a greater complexity of referring
expressions.
The latter interpretation is supported by Fukumura
(2016), who found no relationship between formal lan-
guage and performance in the privileged ground condi-
tion in her ASD groups. Rather, the only relationships
with formal language (British Picture Vocabulary Scale
and WASI vocabulary) were with the number of adjec-
tives produced by the ASD group in the shared ground
condition. That is, those children with ASD who had
larger vocabularies tended to produce more adjectives
in the shared ground condition. Since the shared
ground condition does not diﬀerentiate the partici-
pant’s own perspective from that of the interlocutor,
this ﬁnding merely indicates that those individuals
with ASD who have larger vocabularies tend to ﬁnd
it easier to produce complex referring expression. In
contrast, Nadig et al. (2009) found that formal lan-
guage ability (Clinical Evaluation of Language
Fundamentals (CELF)) correlated with appropriately
informative verbal reference by participants with ASD
in the ‘privileged view’ condition of their director task,
i.e. the condition which required participants to take
the addressee’s perspective, since it diﬀered from their
own. That is, those with higher scores on the CELF
were more able to curtail the usage of complex referring
expressions when this would be over-informative. In
sum, it seems likely that formal language contributes
to diﬃculties with the production of appropriate refer-
ring expressions in children with ASD. However, given
that comparisons with DLD indicated that diﬃculties
in verbal reference production are more marked in
ASD, despite better formal language skills in the
latter group, it appears likely that other factors may
contribute to the observed impairment.
Theory of Mind (ToM) and executive
functioning
Traditionally, diﬃculties with appropriate verbal refer-
ence selection have been linked to diﬃculties with ToM,
which is the ability to represent others’ mental states
including their beliefs, emotions and desires (e.g.
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). However, it is
equally plausible that a failure to provide an appropri-
ate level of information (i.e. under- and over-informa-
tivity) could be due to a failure to diﬀerentiate between
old and new information during a verbal interaction
(e.g. Baltaxe, 1977). Such diﬃculties may be caused in
part by an impairment, for example, in working
memory. Working memory is usually considered one
component of executive functioning, which comprises
a set of highly correlated, but separable, aspects of
memory, inhibitory control and cognitive ﬂexibility
needed for considering consequences to actions (e.g.
Miyake et al., 2000; see also Pennington & Ozonoﬀ,
1996 for an overview of EF domains and measurement
methods).
Given that several reviews and meta-analyses report
clear evidence for impairments in all domains of execu-
tive functioning bar inhibitory control in ASD (e.g.
Hill, 2004; Lai et al., 2016; Russo et al., 2007) and
there is evidence of a link between EF and verbal ref-
erence in TD populations (e.g. Brown-Schmidt, 2009),
it is somewhat surprising that only two studies exam-
ined relationships between EF and usage or interpret-
ation of verbal reference in ASD. Both studies are also
the only two to examine the relationship between the
appropriacy of reference selection and ToM in ASD.
The ﬁrst study, carried out by Dahlgren and Dahlgren
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Sandberg (2008), included only two tasks which might
plausibly be considered a measure of executive func-
tioning and both of these measured short memory.
The ﬁrst was ‘verbal free recall’ (11 lists of words
with 10 words in each) and the second was ‘object
free recall’ (in which the child is shown 10 sets of 10
objects and is required to verbally recall them). In both
memory tasks, once all items had been presented, the
child was asked to repeat as many words (or objects,
respectively) as he or she could remember and in any
order. Relationships were found between both memory
measures and certain aspects of verbal reference,
namely the number of relevant features mentioned
and the ‘eﬃciency’ of reference usage, that is the
extent to which descriptions were optimally informative
(for the comparison group this was only signiﬁcant for
verbal free recall). The authors interpret this as indicat-
ing that working memory impacted on the number of
referential alternatives which a child could hold in mind
and possibly also on the ability to verbally encode the
relevant distinguishing information
Dahlgren and Dahlgren Sandberg (2008) also dir-
ectly examined the relationship between ToM and the
usage/interpretation of verbal reference. To measure
ToM they used a ﬁrst-order change-of-location task
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) as well as Baron-Cohen’s
(1989)’s second-order false belief ‘ice-cream’ task. For
the second-order ToM measure no signiﬁcant relation-
ships were found with any verbal reference measures
for either group. For the children with ASD there
was a relationship between ﬁrst-order ToM and the
same aspects of verbal reference used (number of rele-
vant features mentioned and the ‘eﬃciency’) that corre-
lated with free recall. They note, however, that the
correlation with ﬁrst-order ToM is based only on ﬁve
children in the ASD group who failed the ﬁrst-order
ToM task (whereas 25 children with ASD passed).
More problematically, Spearman’s rho was used for
all correlational measures, when a point-biserial correl-
ation is appropriate for the ﬁrst-order ToM task which
was essentially a pass/fail measure.
The other study which examined relationships in
ASD between appropriacy of reference selection, on
the one hand, and either EF or ToM, on the other
hand, is Kuijper et al. (2015). They used the Stop
Signal Reaction Time Task (Van den Wildenberg &
Christoﬀels, 2010) to measure inhibitory control and
the n-back task to measure working memory. First-
and second-order ToM was assessed in a scale consist-
ing of eight stories (Hollebrandse, Van Hout, &
Hendriks, 2014). For the ‘reintroduction of character
in a narrative’ condition (where a noun and not a pro-
noun would be appropriate), the authors found in a
multivariate model relationships between reference
usage and both second-order ToM and working
memory. Unfortunately, language measures were not
entered into the analysis and the results were conﬂated
over three groups, which included a group with
Attention Deﬁcit Hyperactivity Disorder, making this
ﬁnding diﬃcult to interpret.
Based on the studies included in this review, it
appears there is insuﬃcient evidence to determine
whether the development of verbal reference usage in
ASD is underpinned by ToM and/or EF. The degree to
which ToM and EF underpin the development of
verbal reference in ASD is complicated by the fact
that these two areas tend to be inter-correlated with
each other (e.g. Pellicano, 2013) and also with formal
language (e.g. Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007, for a
review). However, considering the evidence for rela-
tionships between both EF and ToM and other areas
of pragmatics (see, e.g. Matthews, Biney, & Abbot-
Smith, in press) further exploration of the cognitive
underpinnings related to comprehension and produc-
tion of referring terms is clearly a priority.
Summary and discussion
The current systematic review found 19 studies which
met our criteria and in which verbal reference produc-
tion by a group of individuals of ASD was compared to
that used by a typically developing control group.
Seventeen of these 19 studies found that the group
with ASD were impaired in at least one measure in
terms of the appropriacy of match between context
and the form of verbal reference. While many of these
studies had various methodological issues, this pattern
of results also held for seven of the eight studies in
which the typical group were matched to the ASD
group in terms of chronological age, non-verbal IQ
and formal language (Arnold et al., 2009; Banney
et al., 2015; Colle et al., 2008; de Marchena & Eigsti,
2016; Fukumura, 2016; Nadig et al., 2009; Suh et al.,
2014). This stands in stark contrast to the ﬁndings from
the three studies of verbal reference comprehension, in
which individuals with ASD were observed to show
typical understanding/interpretation of verbal refer-
ence. This was even true for the two studies in which
the perspective of participants diﬀered from that of the
speaker and, thus, required a shift in mental perspective
(Begeer et al., 2010; Sanstieban et al., 2015).
However, this apparent discrepancy between pro-
duction and comprehension measures may be an arte-
fact of certain characteristics of the existing studies
rather than an actuality. The ﬁrst characteristic of the
data that prevents us from drawing ﬁrm conclusions is
that the participants of these three comprehension stu-
dies were all adults or older adolescents; there are some
indications that proﬁciency with the production of
verbal reference may ameliorate to some degree
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during adolescence (e.g. Arnold et al., 2009; de
Marchena & Eigsti, 2016). However, improvement
over development seems unlikely to be the full story
for the diﬀerence between production and comprehen-
sion studies since two production studies with adults
with ASD did ﬁnd evidence of impairment in compari-
son to well-matched controls (Colle et al., 2008; Nadig
et al., 2015).
Another possibility is that the apparent discrepancy
between comprehension and production is due to task-
related diﬀerences across studies. For example, the
majority of production studies used narrative elicitation
(for which there is no obvious comprehension-task
counterpart), whereas all three comprehension studies
used a referential communication paradigm (Begeer
et al., 2010; Sanstieban et al., 2015; Volden et al.,
1997). Indeed, one commonality amongst comprehen-
sion tasks used in all three studies (Begeer et al., 2010;
Sanstieban et al., 2015; Volden et al., 1997) is that the
dependent variable is binary forced choice, which is
certainly far from the case for most production-depen-
dent variables. That said, ﬁve production studies (two
of which were methodologically well controlled) also
used a referential communication paradigm, where
the dependent variable could possibly be considered
binary forced choice, and all found impairments in
the ASD group relative to the typical control group
(see Table 5). Therefore, it seems unlikely that the
dichotomy found between comprehension and produc-
tion studies can be attributed to the fact that the com-
prehension paradigms are binary forced choice.
To unpick the cognitive underpinnings of this dis-
crepancy, this ﬁeld needs much more ﬁne-grained task
analysis of the processes involved in the appropriate
selection of referring expressions and of the processes
involved in using the interlocutor’s perspective to inter-
pret referring expressions. It is tempting to suggest that
production of verbal reference is inherently more bur-
densome to executive functioning than is interpretation
of verbal reference. In production of verbal reference,
the speaker requires, for example, working memory to
hold information relevant to the listener whilst a sen-
tence is formulated and executed. If the speciﬁc syntac-
tic form of the target referring expression (e.g. simple
noun phrase versus complex noun phrase) diﬀers
between trials, this may also place additional demands
on mental set shifting, that is the ability to switch back
and forth between multiple trials (see, e.g. Sikora,
Roelofs, Hermans, & Knoors, 2016). That said, even
comprehension variants of the visual perspective refer-
ential communication task have been found to tap var-
ious aspects of EF in the typical population (e.g.
Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Cane, Ferguson, & Apperly,
2016; Lin et al., 2010; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). Thus,
we clearly need a more precise mechanistic model of the
ﬁne-grained steps required for comprehension and pro-
duction and how this might diﬀer depending on the
speciﬁc tasks used for each.
Whatever the explanation for the discrepancy
between performance on laboratory-based measures
of verbal reference interpretation and laboratory-
based measures of verbal reference production, there
is a further overarching issue that needs to be con-
sidered when drawing conclusions about these abilities
in ASD. Even if individuals with ASD are unimpaired
in interpretation using the referential communication
tasks, this does not mean that they are necessarily
unimpaired in interpretation of verbal reference in
everyday life. This is because all referential communi-
cation tasks to date in this ﬁeld have essentially
manipulated only level one visual perspective, which
is an individual’s understanding that the content of
what they see may diﬀer from the content of what
another sees in the same physical position (e.g.
Salatas & Flavell, 1976). This requires the ability to
follow another person’s line of sight and draw conclu-
sions about whether a person’s perception of an object
is occluded, yet one need not have a very deep under-
standing of mental states to determine this (e.g. Moll &
Kadipasaoglu, 2013; see also Sanstieban et al., 2015, for
a sub-mentalising account).
In everyday life, in contrast, the interpretation of ref-
erence is often dependent on ‘social’ perspective taking/
common ground, that is an understanding of what a
speciﬁc interlocutor knows or is likely to ﬁnd interesting
or salient. This often depends on a consideration of
which particular information or experiences we have
shared with which speciﬁc interlocutors. The only
study meeting our criteria which investigated this is
Nadig et al. (2015), who found that adults with ASD
were less likely than typical adults to take discussion
shared with a particular interlocutor (via a referential
pact) into account when selecting a referent term. Of
course, there are numerous divergent ways in which
social common ground can be established with a speciﬁc
interlocutor. One way is through sharing a particular
collaborative experience (e.g. painting an action ﬁgure)
with a certain interlocutor. To date this has only been
explored to a degree in a couple of very small-scale pro-
duction study pilots without control groups (Geller,
1988; Rosenthal Rollins, 2014). No studies have inves-
tigated whether individuals with autism can use social
common ground to interpret verbal reference.
Conclusions
To move this ﬁeld forward, we need studies which
manipulate the role of social perspective taking and
compare this using comprehension and production
variants of the task in the same sample of individuals
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with ASD. We also need the ﬁeld to shift away from an
over-reliance on narrative paradigms. In addition to
some issues with narrative paradigms outlined above,
narrative is problematic here because verbal reference
can be used appropriately in narrative without a real
consideration of the listener’s perspective, by simply
tracking whether the form used for introduction or
maintenance of reference is appropriate from one’s
own perspective (see, e.g. Arnold, 2008, for a discussion
of ‘narrator-oriented’ use of verbal reference). Finally,
we need a more detailed account of how deﬁcits
revealed in experimentally elicited production of
verbal reference link to pragmatic language impair-
ments in naturalistic dialogue. To that end, it is striking
that to date there exists only one case-controlled study
of reference production in conversation (Baltaxe &
D’Angolia, 1996) and this study had highly problematic
methodological issues. We need to empirically docu-
ment in more detail the degree to which an impairment
in reference usage hinders real-life verbal interaction,
and to demonstrate more precisely the potential links
that such an impairment has with diﬃculties in peer
interaction and/or mental health diﬃculties.
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